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Information Issues in Real Estate

Author/s: Seow Eng Ong, Gerald R. Brown

Date Published: 1/01/2001

Published in: Volume 7 - 2001 Issue 1 (pages 61 - 74)

Abstract

Real estate has often been regarded as information inefficient due to its heterogeneity and diversity. While the academic literature has recognized the role of information in real estate, the application of game theory to information problems has been somewhat limited. In particular, we focus on adverse selection and moral hazard. Examples of such strategic uncertainty are provided to illustrate these issues and the potential solutions.

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Keywords

Adverse Selection - Game Theory - Information Asymmetry - Institutions - Moral Hazard - Strategic Uncertainty

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