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Board Size, Executive Directors and Property Firm Performance in Malaysia

Author/s: Roselina Shakir

Date Published: 1/01/2008

Published in: Volume 14 - 2008 Issue 1 (pages 66 - 80)

Abstract

In light of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the effectiveness of good governance in Asian economies has been a confronting issue. This situation raised the key issue in corporate governance of how to effectively monitor managers and to exercise control so that managers act in the best interest of the shareholders. Amongst others, the existence of a board of directors is an important system for shareholding monitoring and control. This research empirically examines the relationship between board size, percentage of executives and performance of property companies listed in Malaysia. The findings provide evidence that the market seems to have a preference for small boards, but with more executive directors.

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Keywords

Board of Directors - Corporate Governance - Listed Property Firms

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